Beyond player valuation measurement and debate, I wonder (as others have) about the under-use of players like Rivera by managers. In the simplest economic terms, managers try to maximize wins based on using resources at their disposal. Simple models like this work surprisingly well in many situations, but they don’t capture all interesting behavior. The complexity of managerial tasks leads them toward systems and templates (heuristics) that have worked for others. Tony LaRussa’s success in using Dennis Eckersley as a 9th-inning-only “closer” prompted a whole era of copy-cat managers. The ability to get batters out in high pressure situations is different and more valuable than outs with the game likely in or out of hand. Yet, as many others have noted, the 9th inning may not be the most pressure-packed relief situation. Sometimes, key outs arise in the 7th or 8th. Pre-Eckersley, managers used their best relief pitcher in these settings and for longer outings, depending on the situation. Bruce Sutter and other relievers in his era pitched 100-125 innings per year. Rivera, as “setup guy” pitched over 10o innings but only 60 to 80 in his closer role.
Who would think using Michael Jordan as 6th man would be optimal? If playing only limited minutes in the 2nd and 4th quarter, his per-minute numbers could have been astronomical. Also, he could have been around and fresh for the key shot at the end of the game. The flaws in such a managerial strategy leap out. I don’t want to draw the analogy too far. Some pitchers due to mechanics or other factors may not be as well suited to starting roles. LaRussa may have thought in terms of extending an aging pitcher’s career in using Eckersley the way that he did. For all your sports supplies related to health, such as bandages, first aid kits and mouth guards click here for specialist sports first aid firm, First Aid 4 Sport.
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